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Abstract: A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of poten-
tial bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget
privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their
values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium typically fails to exist and further-
more no existing allocation mechanism can tackle this case. We propose the notion
of an `equilibrium under allotment' to such markets and develop an ascending auc-
tion mechanism that always nds such an equilibrium assignment and corresponding
price system in nitely many rounds. The auction can be viewed as an appropriate
and proper generalization of the ascending auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
from settings without nancial constraints to settings with nancial constraints. We
examine various properties of the auction and its outcome.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are typically the most ecient institutions for the allocation of private goods and
have been used since antiquity for the sale of a variety of items. The academic study of
auctions grew out of the work of Vickrey (1961) and has blossomed into an enormously
important area of economic research over the last 40 years. The development in the area has
been further accelerated as today governments are keen on using auctions to sell spectrum
rights, to procure goods and services, and to privatize state enterprises. Also consumer-
oriented online auctions are booming to sell virtually all sorts of commodities. The research
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1of the last four decades resulted in a better understanding of how the design of auction
aects its outcome and how the environments may aect the auction design as well.
Standard auction theory assumes that all potential bidders have the ability to pay up
to their values on the items for sale. However in reality many buyers may be nancially
constrained and may therefore not be able to aord what the items are worth to them.
Financial or budget constraints may occur in various circumstances. As stressed by Maskin
(2000) in his Marshall lecture, the consideration of nancial constraints on buyers is par-
ticularly relevant and important in many developing countries, where auctions are used
to privatize state assets for the promotion of eciency, competition and development, but
entrepreneurs may often be nancially constrained. Financial constraints not only occur
in developing countries but also in developed nations. In particular, Che and Gale (1998)
have given a variety of situations where nancial constraints may arise, ranging from an
agent's moral hazard problem, business downturns and nancial crises, to the acquisition
decisions in many organizations which delegate to their purchasing units but impose bud-
get constraints to control their spending, and to the case of salary caps in many professions
where budget constraints are used to relax competition.
Financial constraints can pose a serious obstacle to the ecient allocation of the items.
For instance, nancial constraints seem to have played an important role in the outcome
of auctions for selling spectrum licenses conducted in US (see McMillan (1994) and Salant
(1997)) and in European countries (see Illing and Kl uh (2003)). In this paper, we study
a general model in which a number of (indivisible) items are sold to a group of nancially
constrained bidders. Each bidder wants to consume at most one item. When no bidder
faces a nancial constraint, the model reduces to the well-known assignment model as
studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972), Crawford and
Knoer (1981), Leonard (1983), and Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986), among others.
Each bidder has private information about his values for the items and his budget, but
these numbers are not revealed to the other agents. In particular the auctioneer (seller)
does not know the values and budgets of the bidders. It is well-known (see e.g. Maskin
(2000)) that even when a single item is auctioned, it is generally impossible to have a
mechanism for achieving the full market eciency in case bidders face budget constraints.
Of course, this observation also holds when there are multiple items for sale. Even worse,
when bidders face nancial constraints, a Walrasian equilibrium typically fails to exist, and
allocation mechanisms that perform well when there are no budget constraints, if applied,
often result in highly inecient outcomes.
The natural questions therefore are whether a market mechanism can be designed
that yields an assignment of the items amongst the budget-constrained bidders and a
2corresponding price system that can be reasonably ecient and competitive,4 and what
are the properties of the mechanism and its generated outcome. In this paper we propose
the notion of an equilibrium under allotment to this market model and develop a dynamic
auction mechanism that always results in such an equilibrium in nitely many rounds. The
proposed auction can be seen as an appropriate and proper generalization of the well-known
ascending auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) (DGS auction in short) from
settings without nancial constraints to settings with nancial constraints. An attractive
feature of the auction is that it only requires the bidders to report their demands at price
vectors along a nite path rather than their values or budgets. This property is very
useful and practical, because businessmen are in general reluctant to reveal their values,
costs, or budgets. This also gives an explanation of why dynamic auctions like English
and Dutch auctions are more popular than sealed-bid auctions like the Vickrey auction;
see e.g., Rothkopf et al. (1990), Perry and Reny (2005), Bergemann and S. Morris (2007).
We show that when bidders face no budget constraints, the proposed auction reduces to
the well-known DGS auction and thus maintains the DGS auction's strategic properties.
In this case, the auction nds a Walrasian equilibrium and it is in the best interest of
every bidder to bid truthfully. In case there are budget constraints, the auction might end
up with an outcome in which a bidder does not receive his most preferred item given the
prices at which the items are sold, because this item has been sold to some other bidder. A
bidder that does not receive his most preferred item nds himself rationed on that item. As
shown in Borgs et al. (2005) it is impossible to design truthful-bidding multi-unit auctions
in case of budget-constrained bidders. Indeed, a bidder that nds himself rationed in the
outcome of the auction, might be able to attain a better outcome by misreporting his
demands when this bidder had information advantage over other bidders and when there
were only very few bidders and items. However, in case of at most two items we will prove
that bidders who receive their most preferred item will have no incentive to manipulate the
auction. Another salient feature of the auction is that when a bidder feels himself rationed
in the outcome on some item, then the price of this item equals the budget of another
bidder who is actually assigned with this item and thus pays his full budget. We further
demonstrate that the assignment and price system generated by the auction yield Pareto
ecient allocation of the items and the money, when no bidder nds himself rationed at
the outcome.
The paper is related to several papers on auction design under budget constraints. In
contrast to our dynamic auction for selling multiple items to many nancially constrained
bidders, the existing literature concentrates on sealed-bid auctions for selling a single item
4It is impossible to achieve full eciency and competitiveness, because Walrasian equilibria simply may
not exist due to budget constraints.
3to many bidders, or two items to two bidders. Rothkopf (1977) is among the rst to study
some issues concerning sealed-bid auctions with budget constrained bidders. He investi-
gates how such constraints may aect the best bids of a bidder. Palfrey (1980) analyzes a
price discriminatory sealed-bid auction in a multiple item setting under budget constraints
and gives a complete characterization of Nash equilibrium in the two items or less and
two bidders or less case. Pitchik and Schotter (1988) study the equilibrium bidding be-
havior in sequential auctions for the sale of two items with budget constrained bidders.
Che and Gale (1996, 1998) focus on single item auctions with budget constraints under
incomplete information. They prove that when bidders are subject to nancial constraints,
the well-known revenue equivalence theorem does not hold any more. In particular, Che
and Gale (1998) provide conditions under which rst-price auctions yield higher expected
revenue and social surplus than second-price auctions; see also Krishna (2002) and Klem-
perer (2004). Laont and Robert (1996) characterize an optimal sealed-bid auction in a
single item setting under nancial constraints. Maskin (2000) studies the performance of
second-price auctions and all-pay auctions and proposes a constrained-ecient sealed-bid
auction for the sale of a single item when bidders are nancially constrained. Zheng (2001)
examines a single-object, rst-price sealed-bid auction where budget-constrained bidders
have the possibility of defaulting on their bids. He shows that budget constraints and
default risk together can have a huge impact on seller's prot, bidding behavior, and the
likelihood of bankruptcy. Beno^ t and Krishna (2001) investigate simultaneous ascending
auctions and sequential auctions for the sale of two items with budget constrained bidders.
They compare the performance of both types of auctions when the two items are comple-
ments or substitutes; see also Krishna (2002). Quintero Jaramillo (2004) shows that a seller
can benet from oering small credit subsidies in an auction with nancially constrained
bidders. Brusco and Lopomo (2008, 2009) consider simultaneous ascending auctions of two
identical objects and two bidders and show that even the slightest possibility of nancial
constraints may cause signicant ineciencies. Pitchik (2009) studies a sealed-bid sequen-
tial auction for selling two items to two bidders with budget constraints and incomplete
information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the notion of equilibrium under allotment and gives the basic notions of overde-
mand and underdemand. The ascending auction is given in Section 4, while Section 5
discusses the feasibility and convergence of the auction. Section 6 examines the outcome
of the auction and Section 7 deals with eciency and strategic issues. Section 8 concludes.
Several proofs are given in the appendix.
42 The model
A seller or auctioneer has n indivisible goods for sale to a set of m nancially constrained
bidders. Let N = f1;:::;ng denote the set of the items for sale and M = f1;2;;mg
the set of bidders. In addition to the n real items there is a dummy good, denoted by 0.
The dummy item 0 can be assigned to any number of bidders simultaneously, any real
item j 2 N can be assigned to at most one bidder. The seller (she) has for each real item
j 2 N a nonnegative reservation price c(j) below which the item will not be sold. By
convention, the reservation price of the dummy good is known to be c(0) = 0. A price
vector p 2 I R
n+1
+ gives a price pj  0 for each item j 2 N [ f0g. A price vector p 2 I R
n+1
+
is feasible if pj  c(j) for every j 2 N and p0 = 0. Every bidder (he) i 2 M attaches a
(possibly negative) monetary value to each item in N [f0g given by the valuation function
V i:N [ f0g ! I R. Also by convention, the value of the dummy item for every buyer i is
known to be V i(0) = 0. It should be noticed that a set S  N of real items gives value
V i(S) = maxj2S V i(j) to bidder i, i.e., bidder i can utilize only one item and thus will
never buy more than one real item. So, here we have the well known assignment model as
studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972), Crawford and
Knoer (1981), Leonard (1983), and Demange et al. (1986).
Now we generalize this standard model by considering the situation where each bidder
i is initially endowed with a nonnegative amount of mi units of money. Bidders are not
allowed to have decits on their money balances, so no bidder can aord an item j with a
price pj higher than his initial amount of money mi. This means that unlike in the standard
assignment model, the bidders are nancially constrained by their initial money holdings
mi, i 2 M. Since a bidder i is never willing to pay more than his valuation V i(j) for any
item j, his budget mi is never binding when mi > maxj2N V i(j). We say that bidder i is
nancially constrained if mi < maxj2N V i(j), i.e., the valuation of bidder i for some items
exceeds what he can aord, and that bidder i faces no nancial constraint otherwise. All
values V i(j), j 6= 0, and mi are private information and thus only bidder i knows his own
values V i(j), j 6= 0 and mi. Further it is assumed that all seller's reservation prices, and
all valuations and money amounts of the bidders are integer values.
The utility of a bidder i possessing item j and money amount xi  0 is given by
U
i(j;xi) = V
i(j) + xi   m
i;
i.e., the utility is equal to the value of the item j plus the dierence between his amount
of money xi and his initial amount mi. So, Ui(0;mi) = 0, i.e., the utility of bidder i is
normalized to zero when he gets the dummy item 0 and his initial amount of money mi.5
5Normalizing Ui(0;mi) = mi and thus Ui(j;xi) = V i(j) + xi does not aect the analysis throughout
this paper.
5The utility of bidder i who buys item j 2 N [ f0g against price pj  mi is thus given by
U
i(j;m
i   pj) = V
i(j)   pj:
A feasible assignment  assigns to every bidder i 2 M precisely one item (i) 2 N [f0g
such that no real item j 2 N is assigned to more than one bidder. Note that a feasible
assignment may assign the dummy good to several bidders and that a real item j 2 N
is unassigned at  if there is no bidder i such that (i) = j. Let N = fj 2 N j j 6=
(i) for all i 2 Mg, i.e, N is the set of real items that are not assigned to any bidder in
















for every feasible assignment , so a socially ecient assignment maximizes the total value
that can be obtained from allocating the items over all agents.
For feasible price vector p 2 I R
n+1
+ , the budget set of bidder i is given by
B
i(p) = fj 2 N [ f0g j pj  m
ig;
i.e., the budget set of bidder i at price system p is the set of all aordable items at p. Given
a feasible price vector p 2 I R
n+1
+ , the demand set of bidder i is dened by
D
i(p) = fj 2 B
i(p) j V




thus Di(p) is the collection of most preferred items at p by i within his budget set, i.e.,
an item j 2 N [ f0g is in the demand set Di(p) if and only if it can be aorded at p and
maximizes the surplus V i(k) pk over all aordable items k. When the demand set contains
multiple items, then at the given prices of the items the bidder is indierent between any
two items in his demand set. Notice that for any feasible p, the demand set Di(p) 6= ;,
because p0 = 0  mi and thus the dummy item is always in the budget set Bi(p). In fact
this means that the bidder has always the possibility not to buy any real item.
A pair (p;) of a feasible price vector p and a feasible assignment  is said to be
implementable if p(i)  mi for all i 2 M, i.e., every bidder i can aord to buy the item
(i) assigned to him. Notice that every implementable pair (p;) yields the corresponding
allocation (;x) with xi = mi   p(i)  0.
Denition 2.1 A Walrasian equilibrium is an implementable pair (p;) such that
(a) (i) 2 Di(p) for all i 2 M,
(b) p
j = c(j) for every unassigned item j 2 N.
6If (p;) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then p is called a (Walrasian) equilibrium price
vector and  a (Walrasian) equilibrium assignment. Because all values and money amounts
are integer and the seller's reservation prices are nonnegative integers, it follows that if there
exists an equilibrium price vector p 2 I R
n+1
+ , there must be an integral equilibrium price
vector p 2 Z
n+1
+ . Therefore we can restrict ourselves to the set Z
n+1
+ of nonnegative integer
price vectors.
From Shapley and Shubik (1972) it is well known that in a situation without nancial
constraints a Walrasian equilibrium exists and every equilibrium assignment is socially
ecient. To nd an equilibrium some revealing mechanism is needed, because all valuations
V i(j), j 6= 0, are private information. The well-known auctions proposed by Crawford
and Knoer (1981) and Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) are such mechanisms, we
refer to the auction in the latter paper as DGS auction. In this literature the notion of
overdemanded set of real items is used. A set S  N of real items is overdemanded at
a price vector p 2 I R
n+1 if the number of bidders who demand goods only from this set
is greater than the number of items in that set, see Section 3 for a further discussion of
this notion. The DGS auction is an ascending auction in which the auctioneer starts with
the reservation price vector p 2 Z
n+1
+ given by p0 = 0 and pj = c(j), j 2 N. Then each
bidder is required to report his demand set Di(p). When there is an overdemanded set
of goods, the price of any item j in a minimal overdemanded set (i.e., no strict subset
of this overdemanded set is overdemanded) is increased by one and the bidders have to
resubmit their demands at this new price vector. The auction stops as soon as there are
no overdemanded sets anymore. It is well-known that the DGS auction for the assignment
model without nancial constraints stops in a nite number of price adjustments with a
minimal equilibrium price vector pmin 2 Z
n+1
+ , i.e., (i) there exists a feasible assignment
 such that (pmin;) constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium and (ii) it holds that p  pmin
for any other equilibrium price system p 2 I R
n+1
+ . Since the minimum Walrasian price
vector corresponds to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments (see Leonard (1983)), the DGS
auction has truthful bidding in equilibrium. Also note that in the single item case, the
DGS auction reduces to the English auction.
The following example shows that nancial constraints may cause not only the nonex-
istence of a Walrasian equilibrium but also the failure of the existing mechanisms.6
Example 1. Consider a market with three bidders (i = 1;2;3) and two real items
(j = 1;2). The values of the bidders are shown in Table 1 and the seller's reservation
price vector is C = (c(0);c(1);c(2)) = (0;0;0).
6It should be noted that the existing mechanisms were not designed for the current setting with budget
constraints but for the settings without budget constraints.
7Table 1: Bidders' values on each item.
Items 0 1 2
Bidder 1 0 5 0
Bidder 2 0 0 5
Bidder 3 0 6 5
Case 1 (No Budget Constraints). Then this market has a (unique) equilibrium assign-
ment  = ((1);(2);(3)) = (0;2;1). The set of equilibrium prices is given by
fp 2 I R
3 j p0 = 0; 5  p1  6; 4  p2  5 with p1 = p2 + 1g:
The two equilibrium integer price vectors (for the real items) are pmin = (5;4) and pmax =
(6;5). The DGS auction will nd the equilibrium (;pmin), realizing a social value of 11
and a revenue of 9 to the seller.
Case 2 (Budget Constraints). Let (m1;m2;m3) = (4;3;8) be the budgets of the bidders.
Suppose there exists a Walrasian equilibrium price vector p = (p0;p1;p2). Clearly, we must
have that p1  6 and p2  5, since otherwise no bidder demands a real item. We now
consider three cases. First, when p1 < p2 + 1, then we have that D3(p) = f1g. So, for
equilibrium we must have that p1 > 4 = m1, otherwise also bidder 1 wants to have item
1. However, then p2 > p1   1 > 3 = m2 and thus there is no demand for item 2. So, there
cannot be an equilibrium with p1 < p2 + 1. Second, when p1 > p2 + 1, it holds similarly
that D3(p) = f2g, implying that p2 > 3 = m2, otherwise also bidder 2 wants to have item
2. Then p1 > p2 + 1 > 4 = m1 and thus there is no demand for item 1. Again there is no
Walrasian equilibrium with p1 > p2 + 1. Third, when p1 = p2 + 1, then D3(p) = f1;2g.
When p2 > 3, then bidders 1 and 2 demand the dummy item, and only bidder 3 demands
one of the items. On the other hand, when p1 = p2+1  4, then D1(p) = f1g, D2(p) = f2g
and there are three bidders for 2 items. Again, also in this case there is no equilibrium and
thus a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist.
When one applies the DGS auction, rst p1 is increased from 0 to 1 and then both prices
of the real items are increased simultaneously from (1;0) to (4;3). At each of these price
systems p (with p0 = 0) there is overdemand for both real items because, D1(p) = f1g,
D2(p) = f2g and D3(p) = f1;2g. However, at the next update we have p = (0;5;4) (with
p0 = 0 the price of the dummy item) and the demand sets are D1(p) = f0g, D2(p) = f0g
and D3(p) = f1;2g. So, at prices p1 = 4, p2 = 3, each of the three bidders demands at least
one of the items. As a result, the set f1;2g is a minimal overdemanded set and, according
to the DGS auction, both prices are increased by one. However, at p1 = 5 and p2 = 4, only
bidder 3 demands just one of the items (he is indierent between both items). So, at these
prices the seller wants to sell both items, but only one of the items is demanded. It shows
8that the DGS auction fails to allocate the items. At p = (0;3;4) there is overdemand,
while at the next update there is underdemand. 2
The example demonstrates clearly why under nancial constraints an equilibrium does
not need to exist. Without budget constraint, a bidder withdraws his demand for a real
item when the price of the item becomes higher than the bidder's valuation. However, at
the price equal to the valuation, the bidder is indierent between the real and the dummy
item (i.e., not buying an item). So, when at this price the real item belongs to the demand
set, then also the dummy item belongs to it and the seller can choose between allocating
the real item or the dummy item to the bidder. With budget constraints, by contrast,
there are two possibilities that a bidder withdraws his demand. The rst one is, as before,
because the price rises above his valuation of the item. In this case, the dummy item is
also in the demand set when the price is equal to the valuation. However, the second
possibility is that the price is going to exceed the budget. Then, at price equal to the
budget, the bidder prefers the real item to the dummy one (and so the dummy one is
not in the demand set), while the demand set only contains the dummy item when the
price is increased by only one. In the example this happens when the price system goes
from (4;3) to (5;4). At p1 = 4 the rst bidder strictly prefers the rst item to any other
item (including the dummy item), while at p1 = 5 the rst item is not aordable anymore
and bidder 1 only demands the dummy item (the same holds for bidder 2 with respect to
item 2). So, with budget constraints it is possible that an overdemanded item (or set of
items) becomes underdemanded when the price (prices) rises with only one unit. Because
of this discontinuity of the demand sets, the Walrasian equilibrium fails to exist. However,
without budget constraints the change from overdemand to underdemand cannot happen,
because then the bidder is indierent between a real item and the dummy item when the
price is equal to the reservation value.
The change from overdemand to underdemand in Case 2 of Example 1 is also the reason
why the DGS auction fails to work properly. Rather than follow the DGS auction precisely
(the auction requires to increase the prices of all items in a minimal overdemanded set), one
might consider the possibility to rise only one of the prices at (4;3). However, this is not of
any help. For instance, when only p1 increases from 4 to 5, then at (5;3) there is no demand
for item 1, whereas both bidders 2 and 3 demand item 2. So, item 1 is underdemanded
and item 2 is still overdemanded. Then increasing p2 from 3 to 4, gives again the situation
as described in the example. Similarly, when rst p2 is increased from 3 to 4, then at (4;4)
there is no demand for item 2, whereas both bidders 1 and 3 demand item 1. So, anyway
the procedure ends up with prices (5;4) at which bidders 1 and 2 demand the dummy item
and bidder 3 is indierent between the two real items. Of course, it is then possible to
assign either item 1 or item 2 to bidder 3. In the rst case, bidder 3 pays 5 to the seller
9who keeps item 2, realizing a social value of 6. In the second case, bidder 3 pays 4 to the
seller who keeps item 1, realizing a social value of 5. Both assignments result in a loss of
eciency, because bidders 1 and 2 are willing to pay for the unassigned item, but they
don't receive it. This brings us to the central issue of this paper: the design of an auction
for markets with nancially constrained bidders.
3 Equilibrium under allotment
A possible way out of market situations in which the Walrasian equilibrium does not exist
and thus the DGS auction cannot work properly is as follows: as soon as underdemand
appears, one may allot an item from the chosen minimal overdemanded set at the previous
price system to one of the bidders who demanded that item at that price system, for
instance, by having a lottery between these bidders. The bidder to whom the item is
allotted, has to pay the price of the item at the previous price system. Of course, allotting
the item to one of these bidders implies that the item cannot be assigned to the others who
demanded also the item at the same price. So, the auctioneer can only accept one of the
bids but has to decline all other equal bids. In Case 2 of Example 1 the auctioneer might
accept one of the bids at price system with p1 = 4 and p2 = 3, for instance, by allotting
item 2 to bidder 2 against p2 = 3. Then bidder 2 leaves the auction with item 2 and the
auction continues with the bidders 1 and 3 and item 1, resulting in a price p1 = 5 at which
only bidder 3 demands item 1. This outcome yields a social value of 11 and a revenue
of 8 to the seller, resulting in a much better outcome than the one given at the end of
the previous section. However, note that this outcome can only sustain because the bid of
bidder 3 for item 2 has been declined. In summary, this procedure generates the outcome
(p;) where p = (p
0;p
1;p
2) = (0;5;3) and  = ((1);(2);(3)) = (0;2;1). Observe
that at prices p, bidder 1 gets his best-liked item 0 and pays nothing, bidder 2 gets his
best-liked item 2 and pays p
2 = 3 equal to his budget m2 = 3, whereas bidder 3 gets item
1 (second-best) rather than his most-preferred item 2, and pays p
1 = 5. So, bidder 3 nds
himself rationed at this outcome on item 2, and bidder 2 who receives item 2 pays his full
budget m2 = 3.
The reasoning above gives us a clue to the introduction of an equilibrium under allot-
ment and the design of a dynamic auction. The necessity to decline bids of some bidders
while accepting an equal bid of one bidder induces a situation of rationing. After all, any
bidder who leaves the auction with a net surplus lower than the net surplus that could
have been obtained from an item j when paying the same price as what the bidder paid
to which the item was allotted, feels himself a posterior rationed on the demand of such
an item j. To explore this observation, we adapt the Walrasian equilibrium by incorpo-
10rating the concept of an allotment scheme R = (R1;;Rm) where, for i 2 M, the vector
Ri 2 f0;1gn+1 is a rationing vector yielding which goods bidder i can demand and for
which goods oers of bidder i will be declined. That is, Ri
j = 1 means that bidder i is
allowed to demand good j, while Ri
j = 0 means that bidder i is not allowed to demand
good j 2 N. When Ri
j = 0, we say that bidder i is rationed on his demand for item j. If a
bidder is not rationed on any item, we say that he is unrationed. Since the dummy item is
always available for every bidder i, we have that Ri
0 = 1 for all i. Given a rationing vector
Ri with Ri
j = 0 for item j, the vector Ri
 j denotes the same Ri but allows bidder i to
demand item j by ignoring Ri
j = 0. At a feasible price vector p and an allotment scheme
R = (R1;;Rm), the demand set of bidder i 2 M is given by
Di(p;Ri) = fj 2 N j Ri
j = 1; pj  mi and
V i(j)   pj = maxfk2N[f0g j pkmi and Ri
k=1g (V i(k)   pk)g:
We now introduce the notion of equilibrium under allotment for the assignment model
with nancially constrained bidders.
Denition 3.1 An equilibrium under allotment (p;;R) on a market with nancially
constrained bidders consists of an implementable pair (p;) and an allotment scheme R
such that
(i) (i) 2 Di(p;Ri) for all i 2 M;
(ii) pj = c(j) for any unassigned item j 2 N;
(iii) If Ri
j = 0 for some i, then (a) j 2 Di(p;Ri
 j) and (b) there exist h 2 M n fig with
(h) = j and mh = pj.
Conditions (i) and (ii) correspond to Conditions (a) and (b) of the denition of the Wal-
rasian equilibrium and are straightforward. In (iii) conditions on the allotment scheme are
specied.7 First, (iiia) says that any rationing is binding, i.e., a bidder that is rationed
on some item, demands the item if the rationing on that item is dropped. Second, (iiib)
states that rationing on an item can only occur if the item is sold to some other bidder
and that this bidder pays his full budget for the item and thus cannot aord a higher
price. Together the conditions imply that it is impossible to drop any of the rationings and
that in an equilibrium under allotment the seller extracts all the money from the buyer
that is assigned a rationed item. In an equilibrium under allotment the prices of the un-
rationed items are fully competitive. However, the prices of items for which some of the
bidders are rationed are not competitive prices in the sense that at these prices there is
7These conditions may be seen as the counterparts of standard rationing conditions in x-price litera-
ture, see e.g., Dr eze (1975).
11still overdemand for these items. However, as Example 1 shows, rising these prices results
in underdemand and henceforth items with prices above the reservation prices of the seller
but nevertheless unsold. When there is no rationing in the equilibrium, i.e., Ri
j = 1 for all
i 2 M and j 2 N, the equilibrium under allotment is simply a Walrasian equilibrium.
Parallel to the well-known equilibrium existence theorem of Shapley and Shubik (1972)
on the assignment market without nancial constraints, we can establish the following
existence theorem on the assignment market with nancial constraints.
Theorem 3.2 The assignment model with nancially constrained bidders has at least
one equilibrium under allotment.
In the next Section we design an ascending auction that always nds an equilibrium un-
der allotment, thus providing a constructive proof for Theorem 3.2. To describe the auction
and prove its convergence, we introduce the notions of overdemanded and underdemanded
sets and give some of its properties.
For a set of real items S  N, and a price vector p 2 I R
n+1
+ , dene the lower inverse
demand set of S at p by
D
 
S(p) = fi 2 M j D
i(p)  Sg;
i.e., this is the set of bidders who demand only items in S. Notice that S is a subset of real
items, so any bidder i in the lower inverse demand set does not demand the dummy item
and thus has a strict positive surplus V i(j)   pj for any item j in his demand set Di(p).
We also dene the upper inverse demand of S at p by
D
+
S(p) = fi 2 M j D
i(p) \ S 6= ;g;
i.e., this is the set of bidders that demand at least one of the items in S. Clearly, the
lower inverse demand set is a subset of the upper inverse demand set. Let jAj stand for
the cardinality of a nite set A.
Denition 3.3





An overdemanded set S is said to be minimal if no strict subset of S is overdemanded.
2. A set of real items S  N is underdemanded at price vector p 2 I R
n+1
+ if (i) S  fj 2
N j pj > c(j)g and (ii) jD
+
S(p)j < jSj. An underdemanded set S is said to be minimal if
no strict subset of S is an underdemanded set.
The notion of minimal overdemanded set is due to Demange et al. (1986) and the notion
of minimal underdemanded set can be found in Mishra and Talman (2006) and is used in
a slightly dierent way by Sotomayor (2002). We further say that an item j is overpriced
12if fjg is a minimal underdemanded set, i.e., no bidder has item j in his demand set. So, a
minimal underdemanded set S either contains at least two (not overpriced) items, or has
an overpriced item as its single element.
In the next three lemmas we give some properties, the proofs of the lemmas are relegated
to the Appendix. The rst lemma states that for every nonempty subset S of a minimal
overdemanded set O at p, the number of bidders in the lower inverse demand set D
 
O(p)
that demand at least one item of S is at least equal to the number of items in S plus the
dierence between jD
 
O(p)j and jOj and thus is at least one more than the number of items
in S.
Lemma 3.4 Let O be a minimal overdemanded set of items at a price vector p. Then,




i(p) \ S 6= ;gj  jSj + jD
 
O(p)j   jOj:
The next corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 3.5 For every item in a minimal overdemanded set O at p, there are at least
two bidders in D
 
O(p) (actually the number is jD
 
O(p)j jOj+1  2) demanding that item.
The next lemma shows that the number of bidders in the upper inverse demand set
of a minimal underdemanded set is precisely one less than the number of items in the set
and that any bidder in the upper inverse demand set demands at least two items from the
minimal underdemanded set.
Lemma 3.6 Let U be a minimal underdemanded set of items at a price vector p. Then
jD
+
U(p)j = jUj   1 and the demand set Di(p) of every bidder i 2 D
+
U(p) contains at least
two elements of U.
Mishra and Talman (2006. Theorem 1) establishes the next result for the case without
nancial constraints. In fact, the lemma holds no matter whether there are nancial
constraints or not.
Lemma 3.7 There is a Walrasian equilibrium at p 2 I R
n+1
+ if and only if at p no set
of items is overdemanded and no set of items is underdemanded.
4 An ascending auction mechanism
In this section we introduce an ascending auction which extends the DGS auction to the
current setting with nancial constraints. The auction starts with pj = c(j) for each real
13item j 2 N and p0 = 0. In the rst round the prices of the items in some minimal overde-
manded set are increased. In the DGS auction for the model without nancial constraints
this continues as long as there is overdemand. As soon as there is no overdemand, the auc-
tion ends up with an equilibrium price system and an assignment. However, as Example 1
has shown, in case of nancial constraints it might happen that an increase of the prices of
the items in a (minimal) overdemanded set results in a situation with underdemand. To
deal with such situations, in the modied auction precisely one item is allocated each time
when a price increase results in an underdemanded set. Roughly speaking, the auctioneer
starts by announcing the seller's reservation prices of the real items and requires the bidders
to respond with their demand sets. If there is overdemand without any underdemanded
set of items, then the prices of the items in a minimal overdemanded set are increased with
one and the bidders are required again to report their demand sets. This continues until
a situation is reached in which there is either an underdemanded set of items, or there is
neither overdemand nor underdemand. When the rst case happens, then precisely one
of the items in the chosen minimal overdemanded set at the previous price system is sold
against its price in this system to one of the bidders who had the item in his demand
set. This bidder with the item leaves the market, after which the auctioneer recalls the
previous prices for the remaining items and requires the remaining bidders to resubmit
their demands for the remaining items at these prices. This continues until either all items
are sold subsequently or a situation is reached at which there is neither overdemand nor
underdemand. Then there is an equilibrium for the remaining items and bidders.
At each round t of the auction a new price system pt is announced with the vector
of the seller's reservation prices p1 = C = (c(0);c(1);;c(n)) 2 Z
n+1 at the rst round
t = 1. During the auction process the set of bidders and the set of items are shrinking,
so accordingly these sets and also the notions of price vector, demand set and (minimal)
overdemanded and underdemanded sets all have to be adapted. We denote by Nt and Mt
the set of real items and the set of bidders respectively that are still involved at round t,
meaning that the set of items N nNt has been assigned to the set of bidders M nMt before
round t. Accordingly, pt is a vector of jNtj + 1 nonnegative integer prices with pt
0 = 0 the
price of the dummy item and pt
j the price of real item j, j 2 Nt. Correspondingly, the
budget set and the demand set of some bidder h 2 Mt at round t are given by
B
h(p
t) = fj 2 N





t) = fj 2 B
h(p
t) j V




Notice again that 0 2 Bh(pt) for every pt and thus Bh(pt) is never empty.
14The Ascending Auction
Step 1 (Initialization): Set t := 1, pt := C, Nt := N and Mt := M. Go to Step 2.
Step 2: Every bidder i 2 Mt reports his demand set Di(pt)  Nt [ f0g. If there
exists an underdemanded set at pt, go to Step 4. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3: If there is no overdemanded set at pt, then go to step 5. Otherwise, the




j + 1 for every j 2 Ot, p
t+1
j := pt
j for every j 2 (Nt n Ot) [ f0g, Mt+1 := Mt and
Nt+1 := Nt. Set t := t + 1 and return to Step 2.
Step 4: Let Ut  Nt be a minimal underdemanded set. Then take some item
k 2 Ut \ Ot 1 and bidder h 2 fi 2 Mt j Di(pt 1)  Ot 1g such that k 2 Dh(pt 1),
but k 62 Dh(pt) and assign item k to bidder h against price p
t 1
k . Set Mt+1 := Mtnfhg





all j 2 Nt+1 [ f0g. Set t := t + 1 and return to Step 2.
Step 5: There is a feasible assignment t for Nt;Mt, such that (pt;t) is a Walrasian
equilibrium for Nt;Mt. Item t(i) 2 Nt [ f0g is assigned to bidder i 2 Mt against
price pt
k, k = (i), and the auction stops.
We now explain each step in more detail and then provide an example to illustrate
how the auction actually operates. In Step 1, the auctioneer announces a set of items for
sale and sets the starting prices equal to the reservation prices.
In Step 2, each bidder is asked to report his demand set for the available items at the
current prices. Based on the reported demands from the bidders, the auctioneer checks if
there is any underdemanded set of items. If so, then Step 4 will be performed. Otherwise,
the auctioneer goes to Step 3 and checks whether there is any overdemanded set of items.
If not, the auction goes to Step 5. In case there is overdemand, the auctioneer chooses a
minimal overdemanded set of items and goes to the next round. In this round the price of
every item in the chosen minimal overdemanded set is increased by one unit, the price of
any other item remains constant and Step 2 will be performed again.
In Step 4, the auctioneer rst chooses a minimal underdemanded set. Then she
selects precisely one item, say item k, that belonged to the minimal overdemanded set that
was chosen in Step 2 at the previous round t   1 and that also belongs to the minimal
underdemanded set at the current round t. This item k is assigned to a bidder h satisfying
(i) his demand set at t 1 was a subset of the minimal overdemanded set, (ii) who demanded
the item k at the previous round t 1, and (iii) who does not demand item k anymore at the
current round t. This bidder h pays the price p
t 1
k of item k at the previous round and leaves
15the auction with the item k. When no real items are left, the auction stops. Otherwise,
the auction moves to the next round t+1 with the remaining items and bidders and all the
remaining items are set equal to the prices in round t 1. Step 2 will be performed again.
When the auction reaches Step 5, then according to Lemma 3.7 a Walrasian equilibrium
has been reached for the remaining set of items and bidders and the auction terminates.
It should be noticed that in Step 4 it can never occur that there are no remaining
bidders. Clearly, this is true when the number of bidders m is larger than the number of
items n, because in Step 4 always precisely one bidder leaves with one item. When m  n,
it might happen that at certain round the auction returns from Step 4 to Step 2 with only
one bidder. Obviously then overdemand cannot occur in Step 2. In the next section we
prove that underdemand can never occur in Step 2 when the auction returned from Step 4
in the previous round. So, when after Step 4 the auction returns to Step 2 with precisely
one bidder, then neither underdemand nor overdemand can occur and the auction goes to
Step 5.
Example 2. Consider a market with ve bidders (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and four real items (1,
2, 3, 4). The initial endowment vector of money is given by m = (m1;m2;m3;m4;m5) =
(3;4;3;5;4) and bidders' values are given in Table 2. The seller's reservation price vector
is given by C = (c(0);c(1);c(2);c(3);c(4)) = (0;2;2;2;2).
Table 2: Bidders' values on each item.
Items 0 1 2 3 4
Bidder 1 0 4 8 5 7
Bidder 2 0 7 6 8 3
Bidder 3 0 5 5 9 7
Bidder 4 0 9 4 6 2
Bidder 5 0 6 5 4 10
Without nancial constraints this market has a unique socially ecient assign-
ment  = ((1);(2);(3);(4);(5)) = (2;0;3;1;4), yielding total social value
P
i2M V i((i)) = 36. The ascending DGS auction nds a minimal equilibrium price
vector p = (0;7;6;8;6) and the socially ecient allocation  within a nite number of
rounds. The seller's revenue generated by the auction is 27.
In the current situation with nancial constraints, the bidders cannot aord to buy
items at these minimal equilibrium prices. To nd an equilibrium under allotment we
apply the new ascending auction described above. The price vectors, demand sets and
other relevant data generated by the auction are given in Table 3. Since pt
0 = 0 for all t,
16these prices are deleted from the vectors pt in the second column of Table 3. In the rst
seven rounds the auction operates in the same way as the DGS auction. Both auctions
start at round t = 1 with price vector p1 = (0;2;2;2;2) (Step 1). Then, in Step 2, bidders
report their demand sets: D1(p1) = f2g, D2(p1) = f3g, D3(p1) = f3g, D4(p1) = f1g and
D5(p1) = f4g. There is no underdemand and the auction goes to Step 3. The set S = f3g
is a minimal overdemanded set and the auctioneer adjusts p1 to p2 = (0;2;2;3;2), after
which the process returns to Step 2. Proceeding with alternating Steps 2 and 3, both
auctions generate at round 6 price vector p6 = (0;3;3;4;4). At this price vector there is
overdemand for the items 1 and 2 (there are three bidders for the two items) and, according
to Step 3, the prices of the items 1 and 2 are increased. However, at the new price vector
p7 = (0;4;4;4;4), there is no demand anymore for item 2, i.e., item 2 is overpriced. Now
the DGS auction breaks down without reaching an equilibrium. In fact, due to the nancial
constraints a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. Of course, in this nal round 7 of the
DGS auction the auctioneer can still decide to allocate item 1 to the unique bidder 4
having 1 in his demand set, item 3 to the unique bidder 2 and item 4 to the unique bidder
5. However, item 2 is not allocated and the remaining bidders 1 and 3 don't get any real
item. The resulting allocation gives a total value of V 2(3) + V 4(1) + V 5(4) + c(2) = 29
and is not socially ecient. The seller's revenue from this ad-hoc termination of the DGS
auction is only 12 and her total revenue is 12 + c(2) = 14.
When faced with the overpriced item 2 at round 7, in the new auction the auctioneer
continues with Step 4 and assigns item 2 randomly to one of the bidders 1 and 3. Notice
that both bidders demand item 2 at p6 and that their demand sets Dh(p6), h = 1;3,
are subsets of the minimal overdemanded set O6 = f1;2g. Suppose item 2 is assigned
to bidder 1. Then this bidder pays p6
2 = 3 and leaves the auction with item 2. Then
round 8 starts with M8 = f2;3;4;5g and N8 = f1;3;4g, the auctioneer adjusts p7 to
p8 = (p0;p1;p3;p4) = (0;3;4;4) (with the same prices as in round 6 for the three remaining
real items), and the process returns to Step 2. At p8, item 1 is (a minimal) overdemanded
(set) and its price is increased to p9
1 = 4. At round 9 there is neither overdemand nor
underdemand and the auction goes to Step 5, in which the dummy item 0 is assigned to
bidder 3 (who pays nothing) and the items 1, 3 and 4 to the bidders 4 at p9
1 = 4, 2 at
p9
2 = 4, and 5 at p9
5 = 4 respectively. This assignment and these prices form a Walrasian
equilibrium for the sets N9 = f1;3;4g of real items and M9 = f2;3;4;5g of bidders that
are still available in round 9.
The nal price system p = (p0;p1;p2;p3;p4) = (0;4;3;4;4) and assignment  =
((1);(2);(3);(4);(5)) = (2;3;0;1;4) form an equilibrium under allotment with al-
lotment scheme R = (R1;R2;R3;R4;R5), where R3
3 = 0 and Ri
j = 1 for all (i;j) 6= (3;3).
This equilibrium yields a total value of
P
i2M V i((i)) = 35, which is slightly less than
17the value 36 of the Walrasian equilibrium allocation. Recall that there is no Walrasian
equilibrium at all in this example due to budget constraints. At (p;;R), the bidders
1;2;4 and 5 get their most preferred item. However, bidder 3 gets the dummy item, but
prefers and can aord item 2, but this item has been allotted to bidder 1. When in round 7
item 2 should have been assigned to bidder 3 instead of bidder 1, the auction would realize
a total value of 32. In both cases the seller's revenue from the auction is 15, which is also
her total revenue, because all items are sold. 2
Table 3: The data generated by the auction in Example 4.
Round pt Nt Mt D1(pt) D2(pt) D3(pt) D4(pt) D5(pt) Ot
1 (2;2;2;2) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f2g f3g f3g f1g f4g f3g
2 (2;2;3;2) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f2g f1;3g f3g f1g f4g f1;3g
3 (3;2;4;2) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f2g f1;2;3g f4g f1g f4g f4g
4 (3;2;4;3) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f2g f1;2;3g f4g f1g f4g f4g
5 (3;2;4;4) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f2g f1;2;3g f2g f1g f4g f2g
6 (3;3;4;4) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f2g f1;3g f1;2g f1g f4g f1;2g
7 (4;4;4;4) f1;2;3;4g f1;2;3;4;5g f0g f3g f0g f1g f4g
8 (3;4;4) f1;3;4g f2;3;4;5g f1;3g f1g f1g f4g f1g
9 (4;4;4) f1;3;4g f2;3;4;5g f3g f0g f1g f4g
5 Feasibility and convergence
In this section we show that the auction is well-designed, i.e., all steps are feasible and the
auction stops in nitely many rounds. The proofs of all lemmas of this section are given
in the Appendix.
First, observe that each time when Step 4 is performed an item is assigned to some
of the bidders and both the set of bidders and the set of items decrease by one. So, when
m  n, at each round t we have that jMtj  jNtj. We show that in this case the auction
always stops in Step 5. When m > n, then at each round t we have that jMtj > jNtj.
In this case the auction stops either in Step 4 when Nt+1 = ; or in Step 5. In the rst
case all items are assigned sequentially in a number of n Steps 4, in the latter case the
auction reaches a round in which there is neither overdemand nor underdemand. Then,
according to Lemma 3.7, there is a Walrasian equilibrium for the sets of remaining items
and bidders, showing the feasibility of Step 5. Clearly, also the Steps 1-3 are feasible. So
to show feasibility, we only need to consider Step 4.
The auction starts in Step 1 with all prices equal to the seller's reservation prices.
At this starting price system there is no underdemand, because by Denition 3.3.2 an item
can only be underdemanded when its price is above its seller's reservation price. So, at the
18starting price vector p1 in round t = 1, either the auction goes to Step 5 and stops, or there
is overdemand. In the latter case, a sequence of alternating Steps 2 and Steps 3 is performed
with in each Step 3 an increase of the prices of all items in a minimal overdemanded set,
until there is neither underdemand nor overdemand and the auction goes to Step 5, or
items become underdemanded and the auction goes to Step 4. So, when in some round t,
the auction goes to Step 4 for the rst time, then in round t 1 the prices in some minimal
overdemanded set, say Ot 1, were increased. We prove that this holds in any round t in
which the auction goes to Step 4, i.e., when there is underdemand in some round t, then
there was overdemand at round t   1 and thus, when the auction reaches Step 4 in round
t, then in round t 1 the prices of the items in some minimal overdemanded set Ot 1 were
increased. In Step 4 an item k in the intersection of some minimal underdemanded set
Ut and the set Ot 1 is selected and assigned to a bidder h 2 fi 2 Mt j Di(pt 1)  Ot 1g
satisfying k 2 Dh(pt 1) n Dh(pt). The next two lemmas state that there indeed exist such
an item k and bidder h.
Lemma 5.1 Let U be a minimal underdemanded set at prices pt in some round t and
let O be the chosen minimal overdemanded set at the previous round t 1. Then U\O 6= ;.
Lemma 5.2 Let U be a minimal underdemanded set at prices pt in some round t and
let O be the chosen minimal overdemanded set at the previous round t 1. Then there exist
item k and bidder h satisfying the requirements of Step 4.
In the special case of Ut = fkg with k 2 Ot 1, i.e., the single item k in Ut is
overpriced at pt, we have that no bidder is demanding k at pt. Hence, any bidder h with
Dh(pt 1)  Ot 1 and having item k in his demand set Dh(pt 1) can be selected. Note that
according to Corollary 3.5, there are at least two of such bidders.
The next lemma shows that any time when in some round t + 1 the auction enters
Step 2 after in round t an item k has been assigned to some bidder h by Step 4, there will
be no underdemand of items. So, when the auction arrives in Step 2 after Step 4, then the
auction goes always to Step 3. Then, either there is neither overdemand nor underdemand
and the auction goes to Step 5 (and stops), or there is overdemand and the prices of items
in some minimal overdemanded set are increased. This guarantees that any time when the
auction goes to Step 4, prices in some minimal overdemanded set were increased in the
previous round. Recall that when in round t + 1 Step 2 is reached from Step 4, the price
vector pt+1 is equal to the price vector pt 1, except that some item k has been deleted.
Lemma 5.3 Let U be a minimal underdemanded set in round t that appears after in round
t   1 the prices of the items in a minimal overdemanded set O were increased, and let, in
Step 4, k 2 U \ O be the item assigned to some bidder h 2 fi 2 Mt j Di(pt 1)  Og such
19that k 2 Dh(pt 1), but k 62 Dh(pt). When the auction proceeds to round t + 1 and returns
to Step 2, then there will be no underdemanded set of items.
The nal lemma states that when in Step 4 an item has been assigned, the new
set of bidders Mt+1 cannot become empty. This is obvious when the number of bidders is
bigger than the number of items. However, it also holds when the set of bidders is at most
equal to the number of items. The reason is that when the auction returns from Step 4 to
Step 2 with precisely one bidder, the auction goes to Step 5 and stops.
Lemma 5.4 When in some round t an item k is assigned to some bidder h 2 Mt at Step
4 of the auction, then jMt+1j  1.
The lemmas above show that all steps of the auction are feasible. This gives the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.5 All Steps of the ascending auction are feasible. Moreover the auction
terminates with a feasible assignment and price system in a nite number of rounds.
Proof: The auction starts in Step 1 with all prices equal to the seller's reservation prices
and the auction goes to Step 2. Now, pj = c(j) for all j and thus, by denition, there
cannot be underdemand and the auction goes to Step 3. When there is also no overdemand,
the auction goes to Step 5 and stops. Otherwise, the prices of all items in a minimal
overdemanded set are increased and the auction returns to Step 2. The auction continues
with alternating Steps 2 and 3 until there is neither overdemand nor underdemand and
the auction goes to Step 5 and stops, or underdemand arises for the rst time. Since the
value of any item to any bidder i is nite and any initial endowment mi is also nite, one
of these cases occurs within a nite number of rounds. When the auction goes to Step
4 and assigns an item k to some bidder h. By Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 this step is feasible.
After that the auction either stops in Step 4 because all items are assigned or, according to
Lemma 5.4 returns to Step 2 with at least one remaining bidder. According to Lemma 5.3
there is no underdemand when the auction returns to Step 2 after Step 4. Hence, either
there is neither overdemand nor underdemand and the auction goes to Step 5 and stops,
or there is overdemand again. Then, similarly as above, within a nite number of rounds
again one item is assigned in Step 4, or the auction goes to Step 5 and stops. Repeating
this every time after the auction returns in Step 2 after Step 4, it follows that the auction
terminates in nitely many rounds, because the number of items is nite.
When the auction stops in Step 4, all items are assigned to dierent bidders and
the auction ends up with a feasible assignment and price system. When the auction stops
in Step 5 in some round t, then according to Lemma 3.7 there is a Walrasian equilibrium
20assignment with respect to the set of items Nt and the set of bidders Mt. Together with
the items that have been assigned already before in Step 4, this Walrasian assignment
forms a feasible assignment for N and M. Hence the auction terminates with a feasible
assignment and a price system in nitely many rounds. 2
6 The outcome of the auction
According to Theorem 5.5 the auction nds a feasible assignment in nitely many rounds.
In this section we prove that the feasible assignment and the resulting price system induces
an equilibrium under allotment. Let  be the assignment resulting from the auction, i.e.,
(i) = k for some k 2 N when bidder i was assigned an item in either Step 4 or Step
5, and (i) = 0 otherwise; and let p be the resulting price vector, i.e., when item k is
assigned, then p
k is the price at which item k is assigned to some bidder h, otherwise p
k
is the price of the item in the round t in which the auction stops in Step 5. Since the
auction starts with the reservation price vector C, we have that pt
k > c(k) when in round
t item k is assigned in Step 4, pt
k  c(k) for all items k 2 Nt when in round t the auction
stops in Step 5, and pt




k   1  c(k) when item
k is assigned in round t by Step 4, p
k = pt
k  c(k) for any item k that is assigned in the
nal round t by Step 5 and p
0 = c(0) and thus p is feasible. Further, when a bidder gets
assigned an item in either Step 4 or 5, then the item is in his demand set and thus every
bidder i can aord to buy the item (i) assigned to him. Hence (p;) is implementable.







0 if k 2 fj 2 N n (i) j p
j  mi and V i(j)   p




Theorem 6.1 The implementable pair (p;) and the allotment scheme R yield an
equilibrium under allotment (p;;R).
Proof. We have shown above that (p;) is an implementable pair. So, it remains to
prove that the conditions (i)-(iii) of Denition 3.1 hold. To prove (i), rst consider a bidder
i that got assigned an item k in Step 4 at some round t against price p
t 1




t 1) = fj 2 N
t 1 j pj  m
i; V




After item k has been assigned to bidder i in round t, the auction continues with Step
2 in round t + 1 with the remaining set of items Nt+1 = Nt 1 n fkg. Since at any stage
  t + 1, p
j  p
t 1












21Further, observe that any j 2 N nNt 1 has been assigned in some round   t 1, before
in round t the item k is assigned to bidder i. According to (6.1) we have that Ri
j = 0 for
all j 2 N n Nt 1 satisfying p
j  mi and V i(j)   p
j > V i(k)   p
k. Hence k 2 Di(p;Ri).
Second we consider a bidder i who was assigned item k in Step 5 in the nal round t. Such
a bidder i has item k in his demand set Di(pt) with respect to the items in Nt. Again,
for any j 2 N n Nt that was assigned before in some round   t   1, we have that
Ri
j = 0 when p
j  mi and V i(j)   p
j > V i(k)   p
k. Hence, also in this case we have that
k 2 Di(p;Ri).
To prove (ii), observe that when an item k is not assigned to a bidder i, then k
belongs to the set Nt when the auction stops in Step 5 in the nal round t. Then there
is neither underdemand nor overdemand and, according to Lemma 3.7, then the auction
ends with a Walrasian equilibrium allocation with respect to the remaining items in Nt
and the remaining bidders in Mt. By denition of the Walrasan equilibrium we then have
that p
k = pt
k = c(k) for any unassigned item k.
Condition (iiia) immediately follows from (6.1). Further, since there is a Walrasian
equilibrium for the remaining items Nt and bidders Mt when in the nal round t the
auction stops in Step 5, it also follows from (6.1) that rationing only occurs for items that
have been assigned in some Step 4 before the nal round t. To show that the bidder who
is assigned a rationed item pays his full budget for that item, again observe that, when for
some item j we have that (h) = j and Ri
j = 0 for some bidder i 6= h, then item j has
been allocated in some Step 4 before the end of the auction. Let item j be allocated in
some round t. Then item j was in a minimal overdemanded set O at pt 1 and for bidder
h to which j is assigned it holds that (i) h 2 fh0 2 Mt j Dh0(pt)  Og, (ii) j 2 Dh(pt 1)
and (iii) for all k 2 Dh(pt) it holds that pt
k  p
t 1
j . Since pt
k = p
t 1




k for all k 2 NtnfOg, it follows that p
t 1
j = mh, otherwise j should still have been
in the demand set of h at pt. Hence p
j = p
t 1
j = mh, which shows (iiib). 2
First, Theorem 6.1 shows that the auction nds an equilibrium under allotment
in a nite number of price adjustments. Note that the associated allotment scheme is
endogenously generated. Second, Theorem 6.1 immediately implies that the existence The-
orem 3.2 of Section 3 is true: the assignment model with nancially constrained bidders
has an equilibrium under allotment. Since at an equilibrium under allotment trade takes
place at non-Walrasian prices, the corresponding allocation is typically suboptimal.8 Given
this suboptimality principle, Example 2 in Section 3 has shown that our ascending auction
can realize both a high total value and high revenue for the seller. Property (iiib) of the
equilibrium denition also stresses that the seller extracts all the money from the buyer of
8It is known from the literature on equilibria under price rigidities that equilibria with rationing are
typically not Pareto ecient, see e.g. Herings and Konovalov (2009).
22an item, when other bidders feel themselves rationed for that item.
So far we have considered the case that some or all bidders may confront nancial
constraints. We have shown that the proposed ascending auction can handle such a sit-
uation and always nds an equilibrium under allotment. One may naturally ask whether
the proposed auction can nd a Walrasian equilibrium when no bidder faces a budget con-
straint. The following theorem demonstrates that this is indeed the case. This shows that
the current auction is indeed an appropriate generalization of the DGS auction to the more
complex situation where bidders have budget constraints.
Theorem 6.2 If mi  maxj2N V i(j) for all i 2 M, then the auction for markets
with nancially constrained bidders coincides with the DGS auction and nds a Walrasian
equilibrium with a minimal equilibrium price vector p in nitely many rounds.
Proof. It is sucient to show that the ascending auction never generates an underde-
manded set of items. It is true in round 1 because the ascending auction starts with the
reservation price vector C. Suppose that in some round t, there is no underdemanded
set of items and O is the minimal overdemanded set of items chosen by the auctioneer as
described in Step 3. We show that there will be no underdemanded set of items in round
t + 1.
We rst prove that no subset S of the set O is underdemanded at pt+1. Because
mi  maxj2N V i(j) and 0 62 O, every bidder i 2 D
 
O(pt) who demands items from S at pt
will continue to demand the same items in S and may demand other items as well at pt+1.
It follows from Lemma 3.4 that the set S cannot be underdemanded at pt+1. Second, no
subset S of Nt n O is underdemanded at pt+1, because S is not underdemanded at pt and
the price of each item in Nt n O in round t + 1 is the same as in round t and the price
of each item in O is increased by one in round t + 1. Combining the two reasonings for
the case S  O and S  Nt n O, it follows that also any S  Nt with S \ O 6= ; and
S \ (Nt n O) 6= ; is not underdemanded at pt+1. So the ascending auction never goes to
Step 4 and thus coincides exactly with the DGS auction. It is known that the DGS auction
nds an equilibrium with the minimal equilibrium price vector. 2
7 Eciency and strategic issues
7.1 Eciency
We have seen that under nancial constraints a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist.
Here we can easily show that under nancial constraints even if a Walrasian equilibrium
exists, it need not be socially ecient. Consider a simple market with two bidders and
23one item. When V 1(1) > V 2(1) > c(1) = 0, then social eciency requires to assign the
item to bidder 1. Now, suppose that m1 < min(m2;V 2(1)). Then there exists a Walrasian
equilibrium, but at any equilibrium the item is assigned to bidder 2 at some (integer) price
p1, m1 < p1  min(m2;V 2(1)). So, all equilibria are socially inecient. However, we will
prove that under nancial constraints every Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto ecient. To
discuss Pareto eciency we rst need to give the utilities of all agents, seller and bidders,
at an allocation. An allocation is a pair (;x) with  a feasible assignment and x 2 I R
m
+
a nonnegative vector of money, assigning amount xi  0 of money to bidder i, i 2 M.
Everything that is not assigned to the bidders at allocation (;x), is assigned to the seller.
So at allocation (;x) the seller receives the total amount of money
P
i2M (mi   xi) from




i((i)) + xi   m
i; i 2 M;










to the seller, i.e., the utility of the seller is equal to the total amount of money he receives
plus the sum of his reservation values of the unassigned items. Following the standard
denition, we say an allocation (;x) is Pareto ecient if there does not exist another











with strict inequality for at least one of the agents.
If (p;) is a WE, with p the (Walrasian) equilibrium price vector and  the
(Walrasian) equilibrium assignment, the corresponding allocation (;x) with x
i = mi  
p
(i) is called a (Walrasian) equilibrium allocation. It is well-known (see e.g., Mas-Colell et
al. (1995)) that for exchange economies with divisible goods, under certain conditions every
Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto ecient. However, this result does not apply
to our model with a number of indivisible items and each bidder consuming at most one
item, nor does the result on Pareto eciency of the standard assignment model without
nancial constraints apply to our model with nancial constraints.
Theorem 7.1 For the market model with nancially constrained bidders, let (p;)
be an implementable pair. If (p;) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then its corresponding
equilibrium allocation (;x) is Pareto ecient.
24Proof. Suppose that (;x) is not Pareto ecient. Then there exists an allocation (;x)
such that
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where at least one of these m + 1 inequalities is strict. Dene qj = c(j) for j 2 N,
q(i) = mi   xi for every i 2 M with (i) 6= 0 and Q =
P
fi2Mj(i)=0g (mi   xi). Since
p










Since (i) 2 Di(p), 0 2 Bi(p) and p








0 = 0; i 2 M:
So, for every i 2 M with (i) = 0 it follows from (7.2) that xi  mi and thus Q  0.
Suppose qj > p
j for some j 2 N. Since qj > p
j  c(j), and qh = c(h) when h 2 N, we
must have that (i) = j for some i 2 M. So, in (;x), bidder i receives item j and money
amount xi  0. The latter inequality implies that qj  mi. So p
j < qj  mi, i.e., item j is
in the budget set Bi(p) of i at p. On the other hand
U
i(j;xi) = V
i(j) + xi   m
i = V















which contradicts that (i) 2 Di(p). Hence qj  p
j for all j. With Q  0, it follows from
inequality (7.3) that Q = 0 (and thus xi = mi for all i with (i) = 0) and qj = p
j for all
j 2 N. So, the seller's inequality holds with equality.
Suppose that there is a bidder i with strict inequality, thus
V






Since xi = mi and thus V i((i)) + xi   mi = 0 if (i) = 0, we must have that (i) 6= 0.
Then mi   xi = q(i) = p









Since xi  mi   p
(i)  0 and thus p
(i) = q(i)  mi, this again contradicts that (i) 2
D(p). 2
257.2 Strategic issues
When the auction results in a Walrasian equilibrium, it also preserves the strategic prop-
erties of the DGS auction and thus truthful bidding is optimal for the bidders; see Leonard
(1983). It should be noticed, however, that without nancial constraints in the DGS auc-
tion bidders only drop out for their bidding on an item when another item (maybe the
dummy item) becomes more preferred. Under nancial constraints it might also happen
that a bidder drops out for an item because the price of the item rises above his budget.
However, this does not aect the strategic properties of the auction as long as there is no
underdemand. In conclusion, if underdemand never appears in Step 2, the auction behaves
as the DGS auction, and no bidder has incentive to manipulate the auction.
In general, due to budget constraints a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist and our
auction generates an equilibrium under allotment at which some bidders are rationed on
their demands. In Borgs et al. (2005) it is shown that it is impossible to design truthful
bidding multi-unit auctions in case of budget-constrained bidders. Indeed, it could be
possible for a rationed bidder to attain a better outcome by misreporting his demands if
this bidder knew all valuations and budgets of all other bidders and convinced that all
other bidders would bid honestly. On the other hand, truthful bidding is optimal when the
auction terminates with a Walrasian equilibrium. Observe in this case that at the outcome
of the auction no bidder is rationed on his demand. We conjecture that this is still true in
case of nancially constrained bidders: for every unrationed bidder at the outcome of the
auction it is in his best interest to bid truthfully. We prove this conjecture for the case of
at most two real items.
Theorem 7.2 For the market model with at most two items and many nancially
constrained bidders, let (p;) be the outcome of the auction when bidders report truthfully,
and let i be a bidder that does not nd himself rationed in (p;). Then there do not exist
values W i(j), j = 1;2, and outcome (q;) when i reports his demands according to W i,
such that Ui((i);mi   q(i)) > Ui((i);mi   p
(i)).
Proof. We prove the case of two items, i.e., N = f1;2g. The case of one item can be
shown similarly. Suppose that there exist W i(j), j = 1;2, and (q;) such that
U
i((i);m






For ease of notation, denote (i) = j and (i) = k. If p
k > mi, then qk < p
k. When
p
k  mi, then either k = j and thus qk < p




i   qk) = V











26because bidder i is rationed, and thus also in this case qk < p
k. So, qk < p
k must hold.
Since V i(k)   qk > V i(j)   p
j, we must have that k 6= 0. So, when reporting
according to W i, bidder i gets a real item. Without loss of generality, take k = 1 and thus
q1 < p
1. Suppose q2 < p




is at least equal to 3, because otherwise there are at most two bidders that demand a
real item at q and the auction cannot reach an outcome in which both prices are higher.
So, also when bidder i misreports his demands there are at least two other bidders that
demand a real item from f1;2g. Since also at least two bidders can aord the prices p
1
and p
2, the auction cannot terminate with price system q and assigning item 1 to bidder i.
It remains to consider the case that q2  p
2. Then under the true valuations, there
has been some round t with pt such that pt
1 = q1 < p
1, pt
2  p
2  q2 and p
1 > pt
1 for all
 > t (thus the price of item 1 was higher in every round after t). Then at pt either f1g or
f1;2g was a minimal overdemanded set. In the rst case there was at least one bidder h 6= i
that preferred item 1 to any other item. Since q2  pt
2, also at q all these bidders prefer
item 1 to any other item. Since item j was sold at p
1 and thus at least one bidder has item
1 in his demand set at p and could aord p
1, also under W i the auction cannot terminate
with price system q and assigning item 1 to bidder i. Finally, in case f1;2g was a minimal
overdemanded set, then there were at least two bidders h 6= i with Dh(pt) = f1;2g. Then
for all these bidders also Dh(q) = f1;2g when q2 = pt
2 and Dh(q) = f1g if q2 > pt
2. Since
again a bidder paid p
1 > q1, also in this case the auction cannot terminate under W i with
price system q and assigning item 1 to bidder i. 2
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigated a general and practical market model in which an auctioneer
wants to sell a number of items to a group of nancially constrained bidders. Every bidder
knows his values over the items and his budget privately and the auctioneer does not know
this private information unless bidders tell her. When bidders face budget constraints,
a Walrasian equilibrium typically fails to exist. An ascending auction has been designed
which, starting with the seller's reservation price of each item, always ends up with an
equilibrium under allotment in nitely many steps. This auction provides an eective
allocation mechanism in situations with nancially constrained bidders which can generate
high revenues for the seller and arguably ecient assignment of items among the bidders.
Another interesting feature of the auction is that it can extract all the money from those
27bidders who receive an item on which some other bidder is rationed. We have further
shown that when no bidder is nancially constrained, the proposed auction reduces to the
auction of Demange et al. (1986) and thus preserves the strategic properties of the DGS
auction. We have also examined strategic and eciency properties of the proposed auction
and its outcome.
Finally it is worth mentioning that that Ausubel (2006), Gul and Stacchetti (2000),
Kelso and Crawford (1982), Milgrom (2000), Sun and Yang (2009) have proposed dynamic
auctions for more general environments in which each bidder may consume several goods
but has no budget constraint. It will be interesting but also signicantly more dicult to
study this more general situation with nancially constrained bidders.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proofs of the Lemmas of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Since O is overdemanded at p, the constant d = jD
 
O(p)j   jOj
must be a positive integer. By denition the lemma holds (with equality) for S = O. For
any nonempty strict subset S of O, dene DS = fi 2 D
 




O(p) n DS = fi 2 D
 
O(p) j D
i(p)  O n Sg:
Suppose to the contrary that jDSj < jSj + d. Since 0 < jSj  jOj   1, we have that
jD
 
O(p) n DSj = jD
 
O(p)j   jDSj > jD
 
O(p)j   (jSj + d) =
= jD
 
O(p)j   jSj   (jD
 
O(p)j   jOj) = jOj   jSj = jO n Sj:
This means that the set OnS is overdemanded, contradicting the fact that O is a minimal
overdemanded set. Hence, jDSj  jSj + d = jSj + jD
 
O(p)j   jOj. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.6. If jUj = 1, then U consists of an overpriced item and jD
+
U(p)j = 0.
So, both statements are true.
For jUj  2, denote T = D
+
U(p). To prove the rst part, suppose jTj  jUj   2.
Then take any element k of U and denote T 0 = D
+
Unfkg(p). Clearly, T 0  T and thus
jT 0j  jTj. Hence
jT
0j  jTj  jUj   2 = jU n fkgj   1
and thus U n fkg is underdemanded, contradicting the assumption that U is a minimal
underdemanded set.
28To prove the second part, suppose there is a bidder i having only one element of U
in his demand set. Let k be this element. Then T 0 does not contain bidder i 2 T. Hence
jT 0j  jTj   1 and thus
jT
0j  jTj   1 = jUj   2 = jU n fkgj   1;
showing that Unfkg is underdemanded. Again this contradicts the fact that U is a minimal
underdemanded set. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.7.9 First, let (p;) be a Walrasian equilibrium (p;). Clearly, at p
no set of items is overdemanded and no set of items is underdemanded.
To prove the other direction, let M1 = fi 2 M j 0 62 Di(p)g and N1 = fj 2
N j pj > c(j)g. First, consider any T  M1 and let DT = [i2T Di(p). Because DT is
not overdemanded, jDTj  jTj. By the well-known Hall's Theorem (1935), there exists a
one-to-one mapping :M1 ! N such that (i) 2 Di(p) for all i 2 M1. We can extend 
to a mapping from M to N [ f0g by setting (i) = 0 for all i 62 M1. Next, consider any
S  N1. Because S is not underdemanded, jD
 
S(p)j  jSj. Again by Hall's Theorem, there
exists a one-to-one mapping  : N1 ! M such that j 2 D(j)(p) for all j 2 N1.
With respect to  and , denote K = fi j (i) 2 N1g, L = f(i) j i 2 Kg and





(i); for i 2 M n Q;
 1(i); for i 2 Q:
Clearly, (i) 2 Di(p) for all i 2 M, and no real item is assigned by  to two dierent
bidders, and for every item j 2 N1, there is a bidder i who demands the item at p and is
assigned the item. This shows that (p;) is a Walrasian equilibrium. 2
9.2 Proofs of the lemmas of Section 5





dened with respect to the current set of bidders M, for any set S  N and for any
 = t   1; t.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Suppose to the contrary that U \ O = ;. Since U is under-
demanded at round t, we have that pt
j > c(j) for any j 2 U. Further, since U \ O = ;, we
have for any j 2 U that j 62 O. Hence pt
j = p
t 1
j and thus also p
t 1
j > c(j) for all j 2 U.
Since there is no underdemand in round t   1, it follows that jD
+
U(pt 1)j  jUj. Moreover,
9This proof is much simpler than the original one given by Mishra and Talman (2006).
29any bidder that demands some item j 2 U at pt 1, also demands this item at pt, because




U(pt 1)j  jUj and thus
U is not underdemanded at pt, yielding a contradiction. Hence U \ O 6= ;. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Since O is overdemanded at pt 1, we have jD
 
O(pt 1)j > jOj. Now,
consider the set S = U \ O. By Lemma 5.1 this set is not empty. When U = O and thus
S = O, then by Lemma 3.6 there are jUj   1 = jOj   1 bidders demanding at least one
item from U at pt, because U is underdemanded at pt. So, in this case there are at least
two bidders in D
 
O(pt 1) not demanding any item from U = O anymore at price pt. Select
h from this set of bidders and select k from the set Dh(pt 1) (recall that this set is never
empty and does not contain any dummy item). Since Dh(pt 1)  O and for each bidder
h 2 D
 
O(pt 1), this item k and this bidder h satisfy the requirements.
Next, consider the case that S is a strict subset of O. Denote H = fi 2 D
 
O(pt 1) j
Di(pt 1) \ S 6= ;g. From Lemma 3.4 we have that
jHj  jSj + jD
 
O(p
t 1)j   jOj  jSj + 1;
i.e., the number of bidders in D
 
O(pt 1) that demand an item of S at pt 1 is at least one
more than the number of items in S. Next, consider the set T = U n O. Since there is no








j for all j 2 T = U n O, any bidder that demands an item from T at
pt 1, is still demanding this item at pt, so D
+
T (pt 1)  D
+
T (pt). On the other hand, U is





Further, observe that H\D
+
T (pt 1) = ;, since H  D
 
O(pt 1) and the members of D
 
O(pt 1)
demand only items in O, whereas the members of D
+
T (pt 1) demand at least one item from
T = U nO at pt 1. Therefore, the number of bidders in H that still demand items in S at
pt can be at most jSj   1. Suppose not, i.e., the number is at least jSj. Then the number
of bidders in D
+
U(pt) (demanding at least one item of U at pt) is at least equal to jSj plus






t)j  jSj + jTj = jU \ Oj + jU n Oj = jUj;
contradicting the fact that U is underdemanded. Hence there are at least two bidders in
H that are no longer demanding items in U \ O at pt. Select h as one of these bidders
and k as one of the elements in the non-empty set Dh(pt 1) \ S. Then item k and bidder
h satisfy the requirements. 2
30Proof of Lemma 5.3. First, observe that, by denition of the auction, Mt+1 = Mt 1nfhg,





j for all j 2 Nt+1. Denote ~ O = O n fkg. For S  Nt+1 we consider two cases, namely
S  e O and Sn e O 6= ;. In the rst case we have by Lemma 3.4 that at least jSj+1 members
of the set D
 
O(pt 1) = fi 2 Mt 1 j Di(pt 1)  Og demanded at least one item of S in round














O(pt 1)nfhg that demanded an item of S at
round t   1 is still demanding an item of S at round t + 1. So, when h demanded an item
of S at round t 1, the number of bidders of Mt+1 demanding an item of S at round t+1
is at least jSj, otherwise the number is at least jSj + 1. Hence S is not underdemanded.
For the second case S n e O 6= ; we consider the partition of S given by S1 = S \ e O
and S2 = S n e O. Denote
K














Since Di(pt 1)  O for all i 2 D
 
O(pt 1) and S2  Nt 1 n O, it follows that K1 \ K2 = ;.
Since O is a minimal overdemanded set in round t   1 and there is no underdemand in
round t 1, we have that S1 is neither overdemanded nor underdemanded at pt 1, because
it is a strict subset of O. By Lemma 3.4 we have that at least jS1j+1 members of D
 
O(pt 1)
demanded at least one item of S1 in round t   1 and similarly as above it follows that at
least jS1j members of D
 
O(pt 1) n fhg are still demanding an item of S1 at round t + 1.
Furthermore, none of these bidders belong to K2, because D
 
O(pt 1) \ K2 = ;. Further
jK2j  jS2j, because there is no underdemand at round t   1. Clearly, any member of K2
is still demanding an item of S2 at round t+1, because all prices of the remaining items in
Nt+1 are equal to the prices in round t 1. Therefore the number of bidders that demand






and thus S is not underdemanded in round t + 1. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Each time when an item is assigned in Step 4, the number of
items and the number of bidders decreases with one. Suppose that in some round t Step 4
is performed for the `th time. As long as ` < jMj   1, we have that Mt+1 = jMj   ` > 1.
Now, suppose that ` = jMj   1. Then jMt+1j = 1 and the auction returns to Step 2.
31According to Lemma 5.3, there is no underdemand in Step 2 and thus the auction goes to
Step 3. However, because only one bidder is left, also overdemand cannot occur and thus
the auction goes to Step 5 and terminates. 2
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